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Conventional models of equilibrium unemployment typically imply that pro-
portional taxes on labor earnings are neutral with respect to unemployment
as long as the tax does not a¤ect the replacement rate provided by unem-
ployment insurance, i.e., unemployment bene…ts relative to after-tax earn-
ings. When home production is an option, the conventional results may no
longer hold. This paper uses a search equilibrium model with home pro-
duction to examine the employment and welfare implications of labor taxes.
The employment e¤ect of a rise in a proportional tax is found to be negative
for su¢ciently low replacement rates, whereas it is ambiguous for moderate
and high replacement rates. Numerical calibrations of the model indicate
that employment generally falls when proportional labor taxes are raised.
Progressive labor taxes increase labor market tightness but have ambiguous
e¤ects on search e¤ort and employment. The numerical calibrations indicate
positive employment e¤ects.
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A popular theme in current policy discussions about labor market reform
is that high taxes on labor contribute to high unemployment. Although
the claim appears intuitively plausible, it has not received overwhelming
support from theoretical and empirical research on unemployment and wage
determination. In fact, proportional taxes on labor earnings are neutral with
respect to unemployment in many conventional models and the empirical
research has shown mixed results.1
Most of the theoretical models identify the ”bene…t regime” as the cru-
cial factor that determines how labor taxes a¤ect labor costs and ultimately
unemployment. Taxes are neutral as long as they do not a¤ect the after-tax
replacement rate, i.e., the relationship between income when unemployed
and income when employed. There is in general complete real wage ‡exibil-
ity with respect to changes in labor taxes if unemployment compensation is
indexed to the real after-tax consumption wage through a …xed replacement
rate. Labor taxes are then borne by labor and there is no e¤ect on labor
costs and unemployment.2
The potential for employment gains through lower labor taxes hinges on
the impact on the replacement rate; there will be an increase in employment
only if the tax cut reduces the replacement rate. A bene…t regime involving
unemployment compensation …xed in real terms has this feature. A tax
cut induces an increase in the real wage, which implies a decline in the
relative compensation of unemployed workers. The tax cut works because it
e¤ectively reduces the replacement rate.3
The existing literature on taxes and unemployment has paid little atten-
tion to income sources other than labor earnings and unemployment ben-
1The large empirical literature involves numerous studies of the relationships between
labor costs and labor taxes. Tyrväinen (1995), Gruber (1997), Jackman et al (1996)
and Nymoen and Rodseth (1999) are examples with somewhat con‡icting results. Other
studies have investigated whether taxes help explain the evolution of unemployment over
time and di¤erences across countries; see for example Layard et al (1991), Elmeskov et al
(1998), Nickell (1998), Madsen (1998), Phelps (1994) and Scarpetta (1996).
2This result holds in models with unions, as in Johnson and Layard (1986) or Layard
et al (1991), as well as in models with bargaining between the …rm and the individual
worker, as in Pissarides (1990). The result also holds in various e¢ciency wage models.
3Pissarides (1998) presents a number of simulation results that illustrate the quantita-
tive importance of the bene…t regime for the e¤ects of changes in labor taxes.
1e…ts.4 A shortcut is to allow for exogenous income or utility components,
such as income from the ”informal sector”, income from home production
or a …xed value of leisure; see, for example, Bovenberg and van der Ploeg
(1998) and Mortensen (1994). Tax cuts will bring about a fall in unemploy-
ment provided that (i) the additional income sources are unresponsive to
changes in the real wage, and (ii) more prevalent among unemployed than
among employed workers. The reason for this result is, again, that the tax
cut reduces the e¤ective replacement rate by inducing a proportionally bigger
increase in labor income than in total unemployment compensation.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the e¤ects of labor taxes on
labor market outcomes in a model of equilibrium unemployment where the
worker’s income from home production is endogenously determined. To this
end a search equilibrium framework along the lines of Pissarides (1990) is
extended to allow for home production.5 Time devoted to home production
is taken to be a choice variable for both employed and unemployed individu-
als: the employed worker chooses between time in market work and time in
home production, whereas the unemployed worker allocates his time between
job search and home production. The e¤ective replacement rate – inclusive
of income from home production – is endogenous in this environment, irre-
spective of whether unemployment bene…ts are indexed to labor earnings or
…xed in real terms.
For simplicity, we focus on a one-sector economy where the good pro-
duced in the household is a perfect substitute to the market produced good.
The model is thus not designed to shed light on the e¤ects of sectoral tax
di¤erentiation, where the di¤erentiation may depend on the degree of substi-
tutability between market and nonmarket goods. The existing literature on
taxation and household production has been primarily concerned with the
case for tax di¤erentiation. The contributions in this …eld include papers by
Sandmo (1990), Fredriksen et al (1995), Sorensen (1997), Kolm (1998) and
Jacobsen Kleven et al (1999). Sandmo and Jacobsen Kleven et al consider
economies with competitive labor markets, whereas the other three papers
allow for unemployment due to real wage rigidities.
4A remarkable exception is Edmund Phelps, who in a series of contributions has em-
phasized the role of wealth and nonwage income in the theory of unemployment. See,
for example, Phelps (1994), Phelps and Zoega (1998), and Hoon and Pelps (1996, 1997).
These models imply neutrality of the labor tax in the long run, i.e., once wealth has
adjusted.
5The seminal paper on the microeconomics of home production is Gronau (1977).
2Kolm’s model is richer than ours in some dimensions and more restrictive
in others. Hermodel features two market sectors, with one of themproducing
goods that are perfect substitutes to the goods produced at home. Job
search is ignored, however, which implies that the opportunity cost of home
production is zero for the unemployed worker. A corner solution is then
obtained where the unemployed worker allocates all available time to home
production. Another di¤erence is that Kolm’s analysis is based on a static
model with no attention paid to future transitions across labor market states.
Such intertemporal aspects are crucial in the present paper and deliver a link
between bargained wages and general labor market conditions.
One might ask whether the incorporation of home production in the
search equilibrium model is equivalent to accounting for (endogenous) leisure,
as in Pissarides (1990, ch 6), Hansen (1998) or Marimon and Zilibotti (1999).
In some sense, models of home production are observationally equivalent to
models without, since ”for any model with home production, there is a model
without home production, but with di¤erent preferences, that generate the
same outcome for market quantities” (Benhabib et al, (1991), p 1170). Along
this line of argument, one might argue that any result can be produced by
su¢cient imagination regarding the speci…cation of preferences. Indeed, the
tax-neutrality results obtained in many standard models hinge on speci…c
assumptions regarding preferences, typically utility functions that are iso-
elastic in income.
By introducing home production in the present analysis we can build a
model that encompasses two predictions that appear empirically relevant:
(i) hours of work are decreasing in the labor tax rate, and (ii) equilibrium
unemployment is independent of the level of productivity. The second of
those predictions can also be generated by a model with endogenous leisure,
provided that the utility function isof the Cobb Douglas variety; see Fredriks-
son and Holmlund (1998). The Cobb Douglas representation of preferences
is restrictive for the purposes of this paper, however, as it implies that hours
worked do not respond to after-tax wages.
The next section of the paper presents the basic model, where it is as-
sumed that work-hours are determined by the individual employed worker.
Section 3 turns to the e¤ects of changes in labor taxes in the basic model.
The main analytical result is that a rise in a proportional tax reduces equi-
librium employment as long as the replacement rate is zero or close to zero.
We also consider progressive taxes and show that an increase in progressivity
raises labor market tightness, whereas the e¤ect on employment is generally
3ambiguous. Numerical simulations of the model indicate positive e¤ects on
employment.
Section 4 anlyzes the e¤ects of tax policies under the assumtion that there
is bargaining over work-hours between the worker and the …rm. The results
are broadly similar to those obtained when work-hours are at the worker’s
discretion.
2 The Model
2.1 The Labor Market
The number of individuals in the economy is …xed and normalized to unity.
The individuals are either employed or unemployed, the time horizon is in…-
nite and time is continuous. Employed workers are separated from their jobs
at the exogenous rate Á. Unemployed workers …nd new jobs at a rate that
depends on their search e¤ort, s, as well as general labor market conditions.
If u denotes the number of unemployed workers we can take su to represent
the e¤ective number of job searchers in the economy.
The matchingprocess isgiven by a standard concaveand constant-returns-
to-scale function that relates the ‡ow of hires, H, to the number of vacancies,
v, and the e¤ective number of job searchers, su, i.e., H(v;su). The rate at
which the unemployed worker …nds a new job is given by sH(v;su)=su =
s®(µ), where µ = v=su is a measure of labor market tightness and ®(µ) =
H(v;su)=su = H(µ;1). The rate at which …rms …ll vacancies is given as
q(µ) = H(v;su)=v = H(1;1=µ). Hence, ®(µ) = µq(µ), where ®0(µ) > 0 and
q0(µ) < 0; the tighter the labor market, the easier for workers to …nd jobs
and the more di¢cult for …rms to …nd workers. Moreover, note that the elas-
ticity of the expected duration of a vacancy with respect to tightness falls
in the unit interval, an implication of constant returns to matching; we have
´ ´ ¡µq0(µ)=q(µ), where ´ 2 (0;1).
The ‡ow equilibrium for the economy can be written as an unemployment






Individuals are risk neutral, face an exogenous interest rate, r, and derive
utility from consumption of the single good in the economy. The good is
either purchased from the market or produced at home. Assume that the
decision overhours of work istaken by the employed worker, whoallocatesthe
available time, normalized to unity, to market work, l, and home production,
i.e., 1 = l + he. The unemployed worker divides his time between search,
s, and home production, i.e., 1 = s + hu. The home production function,
zj = z(hj), j = e;u, is increasing and strictly concave.
The employed worker’s instantaneous income is given as Ie = wl+z(he)+
R, where w is the real hourly wage and R is a lump sum transfer from
the government. The unemployed individual’s income derives from home
production, the transfer and unemployment bene…ts (Zb), i.e., Iu = z(hu) +
R + Zb.
Let U and E denote the expected present values of being unemployed
and employed, respectively. The value functions for worker i can be written
as follows:
rEi = wili + z(h
e
i) + R + Á(U ¡ Ei) (2)
rUi = z (h
u
i ) + R + Z
b + si®(µ)(E ¡ Ui) (3)
In a symmetric equilibrium, the utility di¤erence between the expected
present values is independent of the transfer and given as:
E ¡ U =
Ie ¡ Iu
r + Á + s®(µ)
(4)
The employed worker allocates his time so as to maximize rEi, which is
equivalent to maximization of the instantaneous utility. Assuming an interior




i) = wi (5)
implying that the marginal productivity of home production equals the real
wage. Since the production function is strictly concave, it follows imme-
diately that a rise in the wage causes a reduction in time spent in home
5production and an increase in time spent in market work: @he
i=@wi < 0 and
@li=@wi > 0. The indirect utility function is given as ^ Ie(wi). Note also that
the e¤ect of a wage increase on the indirect utility is given as @^ Ie
i=@wi = li,
by the envelope theorem.
The unemployed worker chooses search intensity, si, to maximize rUi.




i ) = ®(µ)(E ¡ Ui) (6)
The left-hand side is the marginal cost of increasing search, which is
foregone home production. The right-hand side is the expected marginal
return from an increase in search e¤ort.
By making use of (4) and (6) we obtain the partial equilibriumresultsthat
an increase in the market wage as well as an increase in labor market tightness
reduces time in home production (and thus increases search): @hu
i =@w < 0
and @hu
i=@µ < 0. These results are implied by the concavity of the production
function and the fact that E ¡ U is increasing in the wage as well as in
tightness; note that the right-hand side of (6) is independent of search e¤ort
(time spent in home production), by the envelope theorem. A rise in the
wage increases the utility surplus from employment, which encourages search
(discourages home production). A rise in tightness increases the marginal
return from search, which has similar e¤ects. Also notice that E ¡ U is
decreasing in the bene…t level, which in turn discourages search e¤ort; hence
@hu
i =@Zb > 0.
2.3 Firm Behavior
The model of the …rm follows Pissarides (1990) with explicit allowance made
for hours of work. Let V be the value of an un…lled job and J denote the
value of a …lled job. The value functions are:
rV = ¡ky + q(µ)(J ¡V ) (7)
rJ = yl ¡ w(1 + t)l + Á(V ¡ J) (8)
6Labor productivity – output per hour – is constant and denoted y. The
cost of holding a vacancy is ky, with k > 0.6 t is a proportional payroll tax






yl ¡ w(1 + t)l
r + Á
(9)
which implies a relationship between the hourly wage cost, wc ´ w(1 + t),








A rise in working time increases the ”feasible” real wage, given tightness
and the tax rate. One can think of this as follows. The …rm has a produc-
tion department and a personnel department. A rise in work-hours allows
the …rm to transfer some workers from recruitment activities to production
while keeping its total workforce constant. The higher output per employed
worker implies a higher feasible real wage. We refer to this mechanism as the
productivity e¤ect of longer work-hours.










where "S ´ wl0(w)=l(w) > 0 is the wage elasticity of labor supply and y=wc >
1, as given by (10).
Empirical estimates of the labor supply elasticity typically falls in a range
from zero to unity.7 If "S = 1, the ratio y=wc must exceed two in order to
obtain a positive sign. This possibility is rather remote, however, as it would
require unrealistically high vacancy costs. We thus assume @wc=@µ < 0.
6The appendix gives a rationalization for this speci…cation of vacancy costs, using a
model of a large …rm that allocates its workforce between production and recruitment
activities.
7The recent and comprehensive survey by Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) reports esti-
mates centered around 0.10 for males and around 0.7 for females.
7Since w = wc=(1+ t) we can use (10) and express the worker’s real wage
as a function of tightness and the tax rate: w = !(µ;t), with !µ < 0 and
!t < 0. The higher the tax rate, the lower the feasible wage at a given level
of labor market tightness.
For later use we derive an expression for the ”µ-constant” wage elasticity















t > 1. Note that »
w
t is increasing in the labor supply elasticity. A
higher tax rate reduces the feasible real wage directly as well as indirectly
through the induced decline in work-hours and the associated negative pro-
ductivity e¤ect. The more sensitive work-hours are with respect to a decline
in the wage, the sharper the reduction in hours and the stronger the negative
impact om the feasible wage.
It is convenient to combine the expression for the worker’s utility surplus,
E ¡U, as given by (4), with the labor demand relationship in (10). We refer
to this expression as the ”feasible utility surplus”, denoted by F(¢):
E ¡ U = F(µ;t) ´
^ Ie(!(µ;t)) ¡Iu(hu;Zb)
r + Á + s®(µ)
(13)
The right-hand side of (13) is independent of hu (and s), by the envelope the-
orem; the unemployed worker’s maximization of the value of unemployment
is equivalent to minimization of the utility di¤erence E ¡ U. Moreover, the
worker’s surplus is increasing in the wage and decreasing in tightness. By
invoking the labor demand relationship we can by straightforward di¤eren-
tiation establish that Fµ < 0 holds.
2.4 Wage Determination
Wages are determined in decentralized Nash-bargains between individual
…rms and workers, recognizing that working time is optimally determined
by employed workers once the wage is set. The employed worker’s indirect
utility function is given as ^ Ie(wi), with the partial derivative @^ Ie
i =@wi = li .
The Nash bargain thus solves:
8max
wi
-(wi;l(wi)) = [Ei(wi) ¡ U]
¯ [Ji(wi) ¡ V]
1¡¯
The …rst-order condition for this problem can be written as









where the free entry condition V = 0 is imposed. J = ky=q(µ) is implied
by these assumptions. One can think of (14) as yielding a ”bargained real
wage”, conditional on labor market tightness and the tax rate. Alternatively,
we can regard (14) as an equation that determines the ”bargained surplus”,
B(µ;t), conditional on labor market tightness and the tax rate:











It is clear that Bµ > 0 holds since q0(µ) < 0. Note also that Bµµ < 0
always holds for a matching function where ´ ´ ¡µq0(µ)=q(µ) is constant.
We assume B(µ;t) = 0 for µ = 0. The Nash bargain delivers a worker surplus
that is proportional to the value of a …lled job, which in equilibrium must
equal the expected vacancy cost. A rise in labor market tightness implies
that the expected duration of a vacancy, 1=q(µ), increases, which in turn
means that the value of a …lled job rises. The Nash bargain gives workers a
share of the rise in total match surplus; hence the rise in bargained worker
surplus.
2.5 Equilibrium
It will be convenient to characterize the equilibrium of the model by making
use of two relationships, namely the feasible surplus, F(µ;t), and the bar-
gained surplus, B(µ;t), as illustrated in Figure 1. Since Fµ < 0 and Bµ > 0,
the equilibrium is unique and labor market tightness is given as the solution
to the equation ª ´ F(µ;t) ¡ B(µ;t) = 0, i.e.,
ª ´
^ Ie(!(µ;t)) ¡ Iu(hu;Zb)















Figure 1: Labor Market Equilibrium
Many of the comparative statics properties of the model are conventional,
at least asfaras the e¤ects on tightnessare concerned. The e¤ect on tightness
follows by implicit di¤erentiation of (16), noting that ªµ < 0; the sign of the
e¤ect of, say, a rise in the interest rate is thus given by the sign of ªr. It
is clear that labor market tightness falls as a response to: (i) a rise in the
worker’s bargaining power, ¯; (ii) a rise in the cost of holding a vacancy, k;
(iii) a rise in the discount rate, r; (iv) a rise in the separation rate, Á; and
(v) a rise in the bene…t level, Zb.
The response to changes in labor productivity is somewhat less obvious.
We wish to have a model with the realistic – and therefore attractive –
property that labor market tightess and unemployment are independent of
the level of productivity. Two additional assumptions are introduced to
achieve this:
(i) Unemployment bene…ts are indexed to labor earnings through a …xed
replacement rate, i.e., Zb = ½wl .
(ii) The home production functions are given as zj = ayf(hj), where a is
a positive constant and j = e;u. In words: productivity in home production
rises along with productivity in market production.
With these assumptions we can state the following result:
10Lemma 1: A uniform increase in labor productivity, i.e., an increase in y,
is neutral with respect to labor market tightness, hours of work in the market
and in the household, search e¤ort, and unemployment: dµ=dy = dhe=dy =
dl=dy = dhu=dy = ds=dy = du=dy = 0:
To prove Lemma 1, note that optimal time allocation for the employed
worker implies a relationship of the form he = h(w=ay) and thus also l =
l(w=ay). The labor demand condition implies a relationship of the form
w=y = Ã(µ;l(w=ay)) ¢ (1+ t)¡1, which can be written as w=y = x(µ;t). Sub-
stituting into (16) while recognizing that zj = ayf(hj) and Zb = ½w(¢)l(¢)
yield an expression from which y can be eliminated. µ is thus independent of
y. Also, using (1), it is clear that unemployment is independent of the level
of productivity.8
3 The E¤ects of Taxes
We proceed to investigate the e¤ects of labor taxes, assuming that tax rev-
enues are spent as uniform lump sum grants to each individual in the econ-
omy. The utility di¤erence between employed and unemployed workers is
thus not a¤ected by the amount of tax revenues raised. The revenue side
of the tax system is hence neutral with respect to the real outcomes in the
economy and we can examine the e¤ects of varying the tax rates without
having to consider how the tax revenues are used. The government’s bud-
get restriction, given as t(1 ¡ u)wl = R + u½wl, is always ful…lled through
adjustment of the lump sum grant.
3.1 Proportional Taxes
Frominspection of (16), it isclearthat the payroll tax rate, t, a¤ects tightness
through several routes. First, a tax increase a¤ects the feasible surplus to
the worker by reducing the real wage and thereby the worker’s utility from
employment: ^ Ie(w) = ^ Ie(!(µ;t)), with !t < 0. The F(¢)-schedule is shifted
to the left. This e¤ect tends to reduce tightness. A second e¤ect operates
8The conditions for ªµ < 0 are more restrictive when the bene…t level depends on
earnings. See the Appendix.
11through the bene…t level when bene…ts are indexed to earnings. The higher
the tax rate, the lower the bene…t level and the higher the feasible surplus
to the worker. A third e¤ect works through the bargained surplus, which
is reduced by a higher tax; the B(¢)-schedule is shifted to the right. This
e¤ect is driven by the fact that a higher marginal payroll tax rate increases
the cost to the …rm of raising the wage, which in turn tends to induce wage
moderation; E ¡ U thus falls, given tightness.
These e¤ects work partly in opposite directions. It is instructive to begin
with a special case where the replacement rate is zero, in which case the
induced e¤ect on bene…ts does not appear.
A Special Case: ½ = 0
To obtain the net e¤ect we di¤erentiate (16) implicitly and obtain:
sign ªt = sign fz
e ¡ z





t > 1 as stated in (12).9 To sign ªt we need to determine the sign of
the term ze ¡ zu. In other words, how does time in home production di¤er
between employed and unemployed workers? We can state the following
results:
Lemma 2: The allocation of time in equilibrium involves he < hu and hence
l > s and ze < zu, provided that the production functions are of the form
zj = ayf(hj), j = e;u.
Note that the equality he = hu would require equality between the
marginal return to market work and the marginal return to search, i.e.,
w = ®(E ¡ U). However, it can be shown that the inequality w > ®(E ¡ U)
holds, implying that unemployed workers spend more time in home produc-
tion than those who are employed. The proof is given in the Appendix.
Also note that the elasticity »
w
t is present in (17). The adverse e¤ect on
tightness is reinforced by a large value of »
w
t . From (12) we have that »
w
t is
increasing in the labor supply elasticity, "S. A reasonable conjecture, then,
is that the magnitude of the response of tightness to a tax hike is increasing
in the supply elasticity. The reason is that a rise in the tax rate reduces
the worker’s indirect utility from employment as given by @^ Ie(w)=@t =
9In a model without home production and with exogenous work-hours, the opposite
e¤ects on F(¢) and B(¢) would be exactly o¤setting. Note that »
w
t = 1 is implied by
exogenous work-hours. This fact, together with ze = zu = 0, imply ªt = 0.
12l(@w=@t). Using (12) we obtain @^ Ie(w)=@t = ¡wl»
w
t =(1 + t). The induced
decline in the real wage is stronger, the higher the supply elasticity is. The
explanation is that the decline in work-hours is stronger, which in turn re-
inforces the fall in the feasible real wage (through the adverse productivity
e¤ect).
Lemma 2 in conjunction with (17) thus imply dµ=dt < 0; a tax increase
reduces labor market tightness. To obtain the e¤ect on unemployment we
need to consider how search e¤ort is a¤ected. Use the …rst-order condition
for optimal search in (6) together with the Nash rule in (14) and the fact












The right-hand side of (18) is the equilibrium marginal return to search,
or the shadow wage of home production for an unemployed worker. A tax
hike thus increases home production – reduces search – both directly and
indirectly through µ(t). The e¤ect on unemployment is obtained by di¤er-
entiation of eq. (1), recognizing ® = ®(µ(t)) and s = s(µ(t);t). The result is
du=dt > 0.
A tax increase produces an unambiguous decline in the real wage. Use
w = !(µ(t);t) and di¤erentiate to obtain dw=dt < 0 (see Appendix). The
e¤ects on he(w(t)) and l(w(t)) are thus positive and negative, respectively.
We summarize the results for the special case as follows:
Proposition 1: A tax increase has the following e¤ects on labor market tight-
ness, real wages, home production, work-hours, search and unemployment:
dµ=dt < 0, dw=dt < 0, dhe=dt > 0, dhu=dt > 0; dl=dt < 0, ds=dt < 0, and
du=dt > 0.
The General Case: ½ ¸ 0
Tax changes will in general induce changes in the bene…t level, which in turn




^ Ie(w) ¡ Iu(hu;½wl)












13where ^ Ie = wl(w)+ze(he(w)) and Iu = zu(hu)+½wl. A tax cut increases both
^ Ie and Iu and the e¤ect on the utility di¤erence between employment and











where @D=@t Q 0 as ½(1 +"S) Q 1. A tax cut increases the utility di¤erence
as long as the replacement rate and/or the labor supply elasticity are not too
high, i.e., as long as ½(1 + "S) < 1. Implicit di¤erentiation of (19) yields:
sign ª
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Expression (17) above is obtained as ½ = 0. The other polar case is
½ ¸ 1=(1+ "S), where ª¤
t > 0 and thus dµ=dt > 0.10 To obtain slightly more
precise conditions we examine the bracketed expression in (21) and de…ne:










Clearly, M ￿ 0 is a su¢cient condition for ª¤
t < 0 and hence dµ=dt < 0.
After some calculations, using also (10) and (11), we obtain
sign M = sign
µ





There are then three cases to consider:
(i) ½ 2 [0;1 ¡ wc=y] ) dµ=dt < 0
(ii) ½ 2 (1 ¡ wc=y;(1 + "
S)
¡1) ) dµ=dt Q 0 (24)
(iii) ½ ¸ (1 + "
S)
¡1 ) dµ=dt > 0
10Too see this, note that (21) can be written as
sign ª¤







t wlg, where Ie > Iu must hold.
14The condition for an unambiguously negative e¤ect is strong, since the
inequality ½ ￿ 1¡wc=y is easily violated for reasonable values of hiring costs.
For example, the parameters used in our subsequent calibrations result in
values of wc=y exceeding 0:9, which implies that the replacement rate would
have to be lower than 0:1 to get an unambiguously negative e¤ect. Note,
however, that the condition is su¢cient but not necessary for dµ=dt < 0.
A tax increase may have a substantial negative e¤ect on the bene…t level
if the replacement rate is high and supply very elastic (so that the earnings
response is substantial). This implies that labor market tightness may in-
crease when taxes are raised. The e¤ect on employment is ambiguous in
general, but negative for the …rst case in (24); the decline in tightness in-
duces a decline in search e¤ort and employment falls. Note that an increase
in tightness need not imply a rise in employment since search e¤ort may
decline.
There are limits to how high a replacement rate the model can take.
The e¤ective replacement rate, Iu=Ie, must be lower than unity to induce
market participation. The statutory replacement rate, ½, must be lower than
the e¤ective rate since home production during unemployment exceeds home
production during employment. Formally, the inequality Iu < Ie requires
½ < 1 ¡ (zu ¡ ze)=wl.
3.1.1 Calibration
We proceed to a numerical calibration of the model. The matching function
is taken to be Cobb Douglas, i.e., H = m(su)´(v)1¡´; it is straightforward to
show that this implies ¡µq0(µ)=q(µ) = ´. We also assume that the worker’s
share of the total match surplus equals the elasticity of matching with re-
spect to unemployment, i.e., ¯ = ´; this is the so called Hosios-condition
that implies that the search equilibrium outcome is e¢cient under certain
conditions (Hosios, 1990). We set ¯ = ´ = 0:5.



























which implies that the elasticity is increasing in he and thus decreasing in
the wage.
The unemployed worker’s time in home production is obtained by invok-















The day is taken as time unit, y is normalized to 100 and the separation
and interest rates are set at Á = 0:25=365 and r = 0:10=365. The parameters
k, a, b and m were chosen so as to obtain ”reasonable” values of "S and
5 percent unemployment for a base run with t = 0:25. We set ½ = :30,
which is an average replacement rate for OECD-countries (see Elmeskov et
al, 1999). The implied labor supply elasticities appear reasonable in light of
the empirical studies; we have "S 2 [:25;:48] as we proceed from t = :25 to
t = :55. The implied partial equilbrium (µ-constant) elasticity of the exit rate
from unemployment with respect to bene…ts, evaluated at the equilibrium
with t = :25, is in a region where the empirical estimates typically fall: we
have @ ln(s®)=@ ln½ t ¡:6.11
We also report the e¤ects on the tax revenues, T = t(1 ¡ u)wl, the
e¤ective replacement rate, Iu=Ie, and the steady state output, inclusive of
home production but net of vacancy costs:
Q = (1 ¡ u) ¢ (yl + z
e) + u ¢ z
u ¡ suµ ¢ ky (29)
11Layard et al (1991) summarize the empirical work by the claim that ”the basic result
is that the elasticiy of the expected duration of unemployment with respect to bene…ts is
generally in the range 0:2¡0:9 depending on the state of the labor market and the country
concerned...” (p 255).
16A measure of the marginal social cost of raising taxes – or marginal ex-
cess burden – is given by ¢Q=¢T, the change in total output per dollar of
additional tax revenues.
Table 1 shows the results of the calibrations. Tax increases produce mod-
est increases in unemployment at low initial tax rates and more substantial
e¤ects at high rates. A comparison with the estimates reported in the recent
study by Elmeskov et al (1998) is useful. This study, based on pooled data
for 19 OECD countries for the period 1983-95, suggests that a rise in the
overall tax rate by 10 percentage points would raise the unemployment rate
by slightly more than one percentage point. These results are broadly in line
with the simulation results in Table 1.
The e¤ective replacement rate increases from 55 to 78 percent as tax
rates are increased from 25 to 55 percent. There are no La¤er-e¤ects, i.e.,
higher tax rates do produce higher tax revenues. The marginal excess bur-
den is modest for low tax rates but substantial for high rates. We have
¢Q=¢T = ¡:18 fortax increases from25 to35percent and ¢Q=¢T = ¡1:06
for increases from 45 to 55 percent
Table 1. The E¤ects of Tax Increases (Proportional Taxes)
Parameters: ¯ = ´ = :5, y = 100, k = :676, a = :5, b = :6,
m = :01939, r = :10=365, Á = :25=365, ½ = :3
t = :25 t = :35 t = :45 t = :55
µ :904 :889 :866 :829
u (%) 5:00 5:64 6:76 9:41
w (index) 77:19(100) 71:44(92:6) 66:48(86:1) 62:17(80:5)
he (%) 9:4 11:4 13:7 16:2
hu (%) 29:5 37:3 47:6 62:7
Q (index) 96:61(100) 95:85(99:2) 94:71(98:0) 92:71(96:0)
T 16:61 20:90 24:08 25:97
Iu=Ie (%) 54:8 60:7 67:9 77:5
¢Q=¢T ¡:18 ¡:36 ¡1:06
173.2 Progressive Taxes
It is well known that progressive taxes are conducive to wage moderation in
a variety of non-competitive models of wage determination.12 Wage moder-
ation is also associated with higher employment in the standard bargaining
(or e¢ciency wage) models. We examine whether these results carry over
to a search equilibrium model with home production and endogenous search
e¤ort. There is no general presumption that the results will carry over, the
reason being that the e¤ect on wage setting is not su¢cient to determine the
e¤ect on employment.
The tax function facing the single …rm is taken to be linear and of the
form:
¡i = ¹0 + ¿wi (30)
The marginal payroll tax rate is denoted ¿ and the intercept, ¹0, captures
the non-proportionality of the tax system; ¹0 < 0 – a tax allowance – implies
a progressive tax schedule. The tax allowance is taken as given by each …rm
and worker. We will, however, assume that it isindexed ex post to the general
wage level, i.e., ¹0 = ¹w. The hourly wage cost facing a representative …rmin
equilibrium is thus given as wc = (1+¹+¿)w, where ¹+¿ ´ ¹ ¿ is the average
tax rate. We can then conveniently investigate the e¤ects of an increase in
tax progressivity that takes the form of an increase in the marginal tax rate
while holding the average tax rate constant. This experiment is, of course,
tantamount to simultaneous changes of ¿ and ¹ – a rise in ¿ accompanied
by a cut in ¹ such that ¹ ¿ remains constant.
Equilibrium labor market tightness with progressive taxes is given by a
modi…ed version of eq. (16):
~ ª ´
^ Ie(!(µ;¹ ¿)) ¡ Iu(hu;½wl)












The feasible real wage is given by the free entry condition and obtained
as:







1 + ¹ ¿
(32)
12See for example Lockwood and Manning (1993), Holmlund and Kolm (1995), Koskela
and Vilmunen (1996), Sorensen (1999) and Fuest and Huber (2000).
18Inspection of (31) immediately reveals that labor market tightness is in-
creased by a rise in progressivity, i.e., a rise in the marginal tax rate, ¿, with
the average tax rate, ¹ ¿, kept constant. This is the wage moderation e¤ect
well known from the recent literature: a rise in the marginal payroll tax rate
increases the marginal cost to the …rm of raising the wage. The (direct) e¤ect
on the worker’s surplus is neutralized by increases in the tax allowance.
The rise in tightness is associated with a reduction in the real wage,
since !µ < 0. This also implies – from eq. (5) – that hours of market
work decline, whereas hours allocated to home production among employed
workers increase. Hence:
Proposition 2: A rise in the marginal tax rate, with the average tax rate kept
…xed, increases labor market tightness and reduces the real wage. Time de-
voted to home production among employed workers increases, whereas hours
of market work are reduced.
To determine the e¤ect on unemployment we need to look at the impact
on search e¤ort. It follows from (18) that a rise in the marginal tax rate has












There is a direct negative e¤ect, which is due to the fact that the returns
to search have declined. There is also an indirect positive e¤ect associated
with the increase in tightness. Clearly, it is the ratio µ(¿)=(1+¿) that matters
for the unemployed worker’s time allocation.The elasticity of tightness with
respect to the marginal tax rate must thus exceed unity in order to guarantee
an unambiguously positive search response to a marginal tax hike. This need
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t > 0 (35)
The elasticity of tightness with respect to the marginal tax rate may
or may not exceed unity and the impact on search is therefore generally
ambiguous. This ambiguity carries over to the impact on employment: the
favorable impact of the rise in tightness is conceivably o¤set by a su¢ciently
strong adverse search response.
The calibrations, shown in Table 2, indicate that more progressive (or
less regressive) taxes do reduce unemployment. Note also that the e¤ects
of tax progressivity on total output are always positive in these examples.
Home production among the unemployed, and thereby search e¤ort, change
very little – and in no systematic fashion – when the marginal tax rate is
increased (e¤ects that are not reported in the table).
Table 2. The E¤ects of Progressive Taxes (Bargaining over Wages).
Parameters (other than tax rates): See Table 1.
¿ = :25 ¿ = :50 ¿ = :75
¹ ¿ = :25 u 5:00 4:57 4:24
¹ ¿ = :25 Q 96:61 96:70 96:74
¹ ¿ = :50 u 8:53 7:72 7:12
¹ ¿ = :50 Q 93:62 93:89 94:06
4 Bargaining over Hours of Work
We now consider bargaining over work-hours between the worker and the
…rm. Suppose that hours of work as well as real wages are determined with
the objective to maximize the Nash product., i.e.,
max
wi;li
-(wi;li) = [Ei(wi) ¡ U]
¯ [Ji(wi) ¡ V]
1¡¯
The …rst-order condition with respect to the wage is given by (14) above,
whereas the analogous …rst-order condition for work-hours is:






w(1 + t) ¡ y
¶
J (36)







which states that the marginal product in home production equals the tax-
adjusted marginal product in market work. The allocation of time for the em-
ployed worker is thus independent of the real wage, and hence also indepen-
dent of labor market tightness; we have l = l(t) and he = h(t). The B(µ;t)-
relationship in (15) remains intact. The slope of the (wc;µ)-relationship, as











Bargaining over hours implies more time spent in market work compared
to the case when the labor supply decision is taken by the worker, as is clear
from a comparison between (5) and (37) and noting that y=(1 + t) > w
because of hiring costs. An increase in working time increases pro…ts per
worker, a relationship that is taken into account in the bargaining solution
but not when the decision is taken exclusively by the worker.
4.1 Proportional Taxes
To obtain the e¤ect of a tax increase on labor market tightness, we use a
modi…ed version of (16) which takes the form:
© ´
Ie(w;t) ¡ Iu(hu;½wl)












where Ie = wl(t)+ze(he(t)) and Iu = zu(hu)+½wl(t). Implicit di¤erentiation
of (39) while recognizing (37) and (38) yields:














t ´ @ lnl=@ ln(1 + t) < 0 is the elasticity of hours of work with
respect to the payroll tax rate, as implied by (37). The inequality ze < zu is
no longer su¢cient to guarantee a negative sign; the third term is positive,
capturing the fact that higher tax rates induce a decline in the bene…t level.
The more sensitive hours are with respect to the tax rate, and the higher
the replacement rate, the more likely the possibility that this ”bene…t e¤ect”
dominates. In general, the e¤ect on tightness is ambiguous.
For the special case with ½ = 0 we have:
sign ©t = sign fz
e ¡ z
ug (41)
Since ze < zu, a tax hike reduces tightness.13 The other results stated in
Proposition 1 are also replicated.
A comparison with (17) reveals that the term involving »
w
t is absent from
(41). This re‡ects the di¤erent bargaining regimes. When the worker deter-
mines work-hours, a tax increase a¤ects the indirect utility only through the
real wage, since hours are optimally chosen; we have @^ Ie(w)=@t = l¢(@w=@t)
by the envelope theorem. When there is bargaining over work-hours, there
is also an e¤ect through hours. A small cut in work-hours, given the wage, is
bene…cial to the worker since the bargaining outcome yields too long hours
relative to what the worker prefers.












where the …rst term is negative and the second positive (since w < z0(he)).
The expression simpli…es to @Ie(w)=@t = ¡wl=(1 + t) if we invoke (37) and
(38). Recall that @^ Ie(w)=@t = ¡wl»
w
t =(1 + t) when the worker determines
hours.
13Lemma 2 holds also when there is bargaining over hours of work, as can be shown
along the lines of the proof given in the Appendix.
22The results of calibrations, using the same parameters as in Table 1, are
shown in Table 3. The results are broadly similar to those reported in Table
1.
Table 3. The E¤ects of Tax Increases (Proportional Taxes).
Parameters: See Table 1.
t = :25 t = :35 t = :45 t = :55
µ :900 :882 :857 :815
u (%) 5:04 5:72 6:94 10:19
w (index) 77:22(100) 71:48(92:6) 66:53(86:2) 62:23(80:6)
he (%) 8:6 10:4 12:5 14:7
hu (%) 29:8 38:0 48:9 65:5
Q (index) 96:76(100) 96:08(99:3) 95:00(98:2) 92:82(95:9)
T 16:75 21:12 24:38 26:21
Iu=Ie (%) 55:3 61:4 68:9 79:4
¢Q=¢T ¡:15 ¡:33 ¡1:19
4.2 Progressive Taxes
With progressive taxes and bargaining over hours, we have hours determined

















where Ie(w;¿) = wl(¿) + ze(he(¿)). The real wage is obtained from the free
entry condition







1 + ¹ ¿
(44)
An increase in progressivity operates through several routes in addition to
the wage moderation e¤ect. A higher marginal tax rate a¤ects the worker’s
utility surplus through hours of work, l(¿) and he(¿), which in turn in‡uences
the feasible real wage, w = !(µ;¿;¹ ¿): A rise in ¿ reduces labor supply and
23increases home production. The net e¤ect on the worker’s total income,
Ie = wl + ze, is positive since z0(he) > w; this e¤ect thus tends to increase
the utility surplus. The decline in labor supply also reduces the feasible real
wage, which tends to reduce the worker’s real income and thereby the utility
surplus form employment. There is also an e¤ect that operates through
the bene…t level. The decline in work-hours induce a fall in the bene…t level,
which in turn increases the returns to employment relative to unemployment.















This expression can in general take either sign but is positive as long as
the tax system is not ”too” progressive. Formally, a su¢cient condition for
©¤
¿ > 0 is ¿ ￿ (½ + ¹ ¿)=(1 ¡ ½). The condition is obviously ful…lled if (45)
is evaluated at initially proportional taxes. Notice the interaction with the
replacement rate; the higher the replacement rate, the more likely that labor
market tightness is raised by a higher marginal tax rate. Loosely stated,
tax progressivity needs to be substantial in order to obtain a negative e¤ect
on tightness from a further rise in the marginal tax rate. The numerical
simulations we have undertaken (not reported), using the parameter values
from Table 1, indicate that tightness increases and unemployment falls when
tax progressivity rises.
5 Concluding Remarks
The paper has explored various e¤ects of labor taxes in a search equilib-
rium model of the labor market. An attractive feature of this model is that
it conveniently allows for an arguably realistic analysis of the unemployed
worker’s time allocation problem in an environment where both search and
home production are options. Moreover, we can analyze how taxes a¤ect
unemployment and hours worked in a uni…ed theoretical framework.
The results con…rm that some wellknown neutrality results in the existing
literature disappear once we allow for endogenous home production. Higher
proportional labor taxes always cause higher unemployment for zero or suf-
…ciently low replacement rates in unemployment insurance. The e¤ect on
24unemployment is ambiguous in general, but the numerical calibrations sug-
gest that tax hikes contribute to higher unemployment. Tax progressivity
is conducive to wage moderation. The e¤ects on unemployment is analyti-
cally ambiguous, but the numerical simulations indicate that unemployment
is reduced – and total output increased – by higher progressivity.
An natural extension of the analysis would be to develop a model with
two market sectors, where one sector produces goods that are close or perfect
substitutes to the goods produced at home. Such a model would allow an
analysis of the employment and welfare implications of sectoral tax di¤eren-
tiation in a uni…ed general equilibrium framework. Such a model could also
be used for comparisons between alternative tax reforms, for example com-
parisons between the e¤ects of general tax cuts and sectorally di¤erentiated
tax cuts. These and other issues are left for future work.
Appendix
A1. On Vacancy Costs
The purpose of this note is to derive the labor demand condition from a
model of a ”large” …rm and show that the chosen speci…cation of vacancy
costs – with costs proportional to labor productivity as given by eq. (7) – is
consistent with a speci…c recruitment technology.
Consider a …rm that allocates its labor force between production and
recruitment activities. Let ni denote the total number of employees and ei
the number of workers allocated to the production department. Vacancies
(vi) are created according to the ”production function”
vi = c(ni ¡ ei)li (A1)
where li denotes work-hours and c is a positive parameter. The net change
in employment is given by
_ ni = q(µ)vi ¡ Áni = q(µ)[c(ni ¡ ei)li] ¡ Áni (A2)










The ratio is increasing in the number of work-hours. A rise in work-hours
means that more workers can be recruited by a given number of workers in
the personnel department. The …rm can thus transfer some workers to the
production department without experiencing a decline in its total workforce.
This implies a rise in labor productivity, which in turn increases the feasible
real wage, i.e., the wage that the …rm can o¤er its workers at zero pro…ts.
Let the …rm’s pro…ts be given by
¼i = eiliy ¡ wcnili (A4)








This is an equation of the same form as eq. (10) in the main text, with
r = 0 and k = 1=c.
A dynamic formulation yields the same expression, except for an inter-
est factor. Suppose that the …rm’s objective is to maximize the present




exp(¡rt)[eiliy ¡ wcnili]dt (A6)
The …rm’s problem is to maximize ¦i subject to (A2). By standard









which is equivalent to the labor demand condition given by (10) in the main
text.
26A2. Proof of Lemma 2
To prove Lemma 2, note that he = hu requires that the marginal return to
market work must equal the marginal return to search, i.e., w = ®(E ¡ U).
Moreover, this equality must be invariant to a uniform rise in labor produc-
tivity, assuming production functions of the form zj = ayf(hj), j = e;u. A












as implied by (10). The e¤ect on the marginal return to search is given by














These expressions make use of the results that tightness and time allocation
are invariant to a uniform rise in productivity. By evaluating (A9) at he = hu,
and thus l = s, we obtain
￿















which implies that the marginal return to market work exceeds the marginal
return to search. The inequality l > s must thus hold, and hence ze < zu, as
he < hu.
A3. Taxes and Real Wages
To obtain the e¤ect on the real wage we use eq. (10), recognizing µ(t). The






































t > 0 (A12)
27The elasticity of tightness with respect to the tax rate is obtained from







Ie ¡Iu ¡ wl ¢ »
w
t
° (Ie ¡Iu) + wl ¢ "w
µ
> 0 (A13)
where ° ´ ((r + Á)´ + s®)=(r + Á + s®), ° 2 (0;1). The real wage elasticity






t )(Ie ¡ Iu)
°(Ie ¡ Iu) + wl ¢ "w
µ
< 0 (A14)
A4. The Sign of ªµ when ½ > 0
The comparative statics have been performed under the assumption that
ªµ ´ Fµ ¡Bµ < 0. Given our assumptions, this inequality always hold when
½ = 0, in which case Fµ < 0. When the replacement rate is positive, the















where ° is de…ned above. The expression is negative for a su¢ciently low
replacement rate and/or a su¢ciently low labor supply elasticity. We assume
that the conditions for ªµ < 0 are ful…lled.
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